What happened?
An incident at Leipzig Airport has recently exposed how vulnerable Germany's critical infrastructure is to threats from the air. In an interview with Protector Magazin, Carsten Simons, Managing Director of LivEye GmbH, explains why the public debate about shooting down drones misses the actual weak point: many sites still lack the technical foundation to reliably detect and locate drones in their own airspace in the first place.
The details
According to Simons, security personnel in operational practice are increasingly seeing drones over critical facilities that are neither announced nor clearly identifiable. His central point: not every overflight is automatically an attack, but every unexplained overflight is a security event that must be assessed. Anyone who doesn't know that a drone is approaching, where it is located, and where its operator might be, cannot make an effective decision.
As a technical solution, Simons cites mobile and modular systems that can quickly establish a site-specific drone situational picture, without operators having to wait for large, rigid, and expensive stationary overall systems. LivEye relies on passive radio frequency sensor technology, which, depending on the risk profile, is supplemented by radar as well as optical and thermal cameras. What matters, he says, is that this sensor information does not remain isolated but is consolidated on a single platform, verified, and transmitted to the control center in real time. According to Simons, such capabilities can be provided at short notice and scaled as needed using the products LivEye Drone Detect and LivEye Drone Locate.
Simons compares the basic logic to classic ground-based perimeter protection: threats must be detected early, assessed, and handled according to clearly defined procedures. For drones, this means assessing the situation within the shortest possible time and initiating protective measures—such as clearing sensitive areas, adjusting operational procedures, controlled shutdown of endangered facilities, or moving employees to protected areas. At the same time, the position, flight path, altitude, timing, and, if possible, the operator's location must be documented and communicated to emergency responders.
Assessment
Simons makes clear that a sensor alert alone prevents neither damage nor danger. Effective protection only emerges when detection, the control center, defined response measures, and the alerting of authorities interlock seamlessly, and when these processes are regularly trained. This brings the aspect of organizational maturity to the forefront alongside pure technology procurement.
Simons also sees a need for regulatory action. He hopes that lawmakers will in future create clearly defined options under which qualified operators may themselves take action against an immediately threatening drone—up to and including kinetic defense. At the same time, he explicitly warns that this must not become a general blank check for shooting drones down. Bringing a drone down from the sky creates new risks: misidentification, falling debris, endangerment of uninvolved persons, impacts on air traffic, and significant liability issues. In addition, there are requirements regarding training, certification, incident command, and documentation.
Simons therefore advocates a tiered model: operators should be legally able to detect, locate, and initiate local protective measures, while active defense authority should remain reserved for certified personnel, clearly defined threat scenarios, and government oversight.
Practical tips
For security officers at airports, energy suppliers, or industrial facilities, Simons names concrete first steps on the path to becoming "C-UAS-ready":
- First, establish a real situational picture: What drone movements are actually occurring over the site, from which directions do they come, and which areas are particularly at risk?
- Building on this, define protection zones, alert levels, and specific measures.
- Clarify responsibilities: Who assesses the alert? Who informs management? Which local protective measures take effect? Who alerts which authority?
- Only after that, make a well-founded decision about which sensor network and which further defense capabilities are actually required.
- Don't rely on technology alone: according to Simons, a site is only "C-UAS-ready" once technology, people, processes, and communication with authorities function as an integrated overall system.
Outlook
The Leipzig case is likely to further fuel the debate on drone protection at critical infrastructure sites. Simons's position shifts the focus away from the emotionally charged debate over shooting drones down and toward a sober stocktaking: without reliable detection and localization, there is no basis for any further measures. Should lawmakers, as Simons hopes, actually create a tiered model with clearly regulated powers for qualified operators, this would give critical infrastructure operators greater legal certainty in their actions. Until then, building detection and reporting chains remains the practical first step that operators can already implement today using mobile and modular solutions, without having to wait for comprehensive regulatory or technical overall solutions.
